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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with the computation and analysis of some fundamental reserve aggregates 
and associated monetary statistics which impart important information regarding the design 
and conduct of monetary policy at the State Bank of Pakistan. Specifically, we compute the 
data series for borrowed, unborrowed, free and drainable reserves using balance sheet data 
published by the State Bank of Pakistan for the period 1985-2009. Results show that 
Pakistan’s monetary policy revolves around managing the exchange rate while using the t-
bill rate as the key policy instrument. However, the value of the t-bill rate is both incorrectly 
and sub-optimally related to macroeconomic fundamentals rendering monetary policy time 
inconsistent. This hinges on the finding that since 2000-01, State Bank of Pakistan is 
targeting net free reserves of the banking system at 4% of total private deposits. Among other 
observations, we find that the scope of open market operations as a tool of monetary policy 
remains but limited and that this limited role of open market defenses derives from an 
indiscreet concern of the central bank to sterilize its own foreign exchange reserves. 
Furthermore, the growth rate of unborrowed plus drainable reserves bears a strong negative 
correlation with the annual average rate of inflation, which, on account of the former being 
consistently negative since 2005, implies that the government and the State Bank of Pakistan 
both have absolutely no concern for controlling inflation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with the computation, presentation and analysis of some fundamental 
reserve aggregates and associated monetary statistics for Pakistan that the State Bank of 
Pakistan does not explicitly publish (or even make any reference to in policy discussions) but 
which, nevertheless, impart important information regarding the design and conduct of 
monetary policy at the State Bank of Pakistan. 
 
Our analysis originates in the fundamental question as to what drives monetary policy at the 
State Bank of Pakistan (hereafter referred as SBP). The SBP describes its policy as a set of 
discretionary measures that it implements as and when it deems necessary and which derive 
from a detailed review of the state of the economy, the practices of the banking system and 
the statement of objectives of monetary policy (See e.g. State Bank of Pakistan, 2009a, 
2009b). In stark contrast to the claims of the SBP, we find that changes in t-bill rate are 
systematically related to the rate of growth of national output; the rate of inflation and the 
currency depreciation rate (Hassan and Shahzad, 2010) 1 . This implies that the SBP is 
implicitly subscribing to a Taylor type rule (see Taylor, 1993, 1998) which, quite unusually, 
dictates it to (i) raise the t-bill rate when output growth declines (Malik and Ahmad, 2007 
also observe the same) and to (ii) raise the t-bill rate when inflation increases (only in the 
long run) but by less than the amount of increase in inflation. This situation is further riddled 
by the SBP’s claim that changes in t-bill rate do not necessarily reflect changes in monetary 
policy and that the key monetary policy instrument at the SBP is the discount rate (State 
Bank of Pakistan, 2009b). 
 
The design and conduct of monetary policy, apart from the standard procedure of 
determining objectives, setting quantitative targets, choosing instruments and ascertaining the 
                                                 
1  The policy rule equation referred to here states that: 
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TBR, INFL DEPRIC and YNR and D04 indicate the t-bill rate, inflation rate, currency depreciation rate, real 
national output and the 2004 dummy respectively. Hassan and Shahzad (2010) estimates this equation 
consistently (as all right hand variables are stationary) using OLS with actual data from 1991-2007. The 
equation has an adjusted 95% fit with no signs of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, parameter instability 
or structural shift and tracks the policy rate with precision. It typifies the Taylor rule when we assume that 
expected inflation and potential output respectively equal their last period values. 
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way changes in instruments will help attain the objectives, requires the central bank to 
choose an operational target of monetary policy. This operational target is “an economic 
variable, which the central bank wants to control, and indeed can control, to a very large 
extent on a day-by-day basis through the use of its monetary policy instruments” (Bindseil, 
2004). The SBP has never explicitly stated its operational target in any of its publications 
except for the recent Monetary Policy Statement (State Bank of Pakistan, 2009b) which states 
that the SBP targets the rate of monetary expansion consistent with (i) estimates of net 
foreign assets, (ii) estimates of government’s budgetary borrowing, and (iii) aggregate 
demand pressure reflected in the saving-investment gap. The Statement outlines a complete 
operational procedure for monetary policy in terms of a target range set for the Reverse Repo 
Rate that is consistent with the fundamental equation of monetary policy (see Bindseil (2004) 
for a detailed rationale and description of the policy equation). 
 
The question as to whether the operational target of monetary policy should be a reserve 
variable (as suggested by the Reserve Position Doctrine) or an interest rate variable (that 
constitutes recent practice at many central banks) happened to be the subject of a long 
standing debate in monetary policy making until the recent past (see Bindseil, 2004). Since 
SBP has never officially subscribed to either of these positions, and since it actively denies 
subscribing to a Taylor-type rule, therefore, we construct the reserve aggregates for Pakistan 
to ascertain the operational basis of its monetary policy. Specifically, we use the balance 
sheet data of the SBP and the banking system to construct the various reserve variables like 
free reserves, borrowed reserves and unborrowed reserves in conjunction with the reserve 
equation to determine the operational targets of monetary policy that have been used by the 
SBP over the past. Since, from a purely technical viewpoint, operational targets specified in 
terms of interest rates may be translated in terms of reserve targets and vice-versa by making 
use of the fundamental equation of monetary policy (see Bindseil, 2004; Mayes and 
Toporowski, 2007), therefore this exercise is expected to reveal the cornerstones of SBP’s 
monetary policy. The analysis is also important in that it provides for the core element of any 
econometric model that incorporates banking sector behavior while analyzing monetary 
policy. 
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The rest of the paper is organized in three sections. In section II, we explain the theoretical 
linkages that lead to the empirical determination of the reserve equation for Pakistan. The 
reserve equation is then used to derive some useful monetary statistics for Pakistan over the 
period 1975-2007. Statistical calculation of the various components of reserve money, 
reserve equation and monetary statistics is reported in section III along with a discussion of 
their behaviour and insights about monetary policy. The paper concludes in section IV. 
 
II. RESERVE EQUATION AND THE ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POLICY 
The analysis of monetary policy in terms of the reserve equation had been the central idea of 
the ‘Reserve Position Doctrine’ (RPD) that remained the popular monetary policy paradigm 
at the Federal Reserve Bank from the 1920’s until the late 1980’s when the Federal Reserve 
first switched to inflation targeting and then to interest rate management as a guide to 
monetary policy2. The central idea of the reserve position doctrine is that by managing one or 
the other reserve aggregate, the central bank can easily keep money supply on its desired 
path3. The formal analysis of money supply in terms of the reserve aggregates originated in 
the works of Meigs (1962) and has been described in many standard monetary economics 
texts (see for example, Teigen, 1978; Branson, 1989). Although central banks and academic 
economists no longer rely on the reserve concepts when describing or setting monetary 
policy, the informational content of these concepts can seldom be denied (see e.g. 
Toporowski, 2006). 
 
                                                 
2  The Federal Reserve has never adopted explicit inflation targeting. However, this is a debatable issue. 
Bindseil (2004) argues that the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan was following an implicit inflation 
targeting regime. Clarida, Gali and Gertler, (2000) argue that active stance against inflation proved decisive 
in controlling inflation during the Volcker-Greenspan era. They write: “it is not the target but the attitude 
to inflation which matters”. Similarly, Favero and Rovelli (2001) try to determine the preferences of a 
central bank by calibrating first order conditions on minimization of an appropriate quadratic loss function. 
They also find a slight shift (although statistically insignificant) in FED behavior during the Volcker-
Greenspan era towards inflation. Bernanke (2004), argues how the FED has emerged as a strong inflation 
fighter without explicitly subscribing to an inflation targeting regime, While Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1998) describe a large number of policy rules which are consistent with an inflation targeting (explicit or 
implicit regime). 
3   Borrowed reserves, unborrowed reserves, total reserves and excess reserves have all been proposed and 
used as potential operational targets of monetary policy over the seventy years life span of the doctrine. A 
discussion of when and how a certain reserve aggregate was being used by the Fed as a target and why it 
was abandoned may be found in Bindseil, 2004. 
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Below, we show, both theoretically and empirically, how the monetary data published by the 
State Bank of Pakistan can be used to determine the quantity of reserve money and the 
reserve equation for Pakistan and then explain some essential facts about monetary 
operations and monetary policy that the State Bank of Pakistan has never explicitly published 
or used but which, spontaneously, constitute the core of its monetary operations and 
monetary policy. 
 
II (A) Derivation of the Reserve Equation  
Reserve money may be defined in three alternative ways: first, it is the sum total of the 
liabilities of the central bank; secondly, since assets and liabilities balance out4, reserve 
money is also the aggregate of the asset side of the central bank’s balance sheets; and finally, 
reserve money may be determined by accounting for the sources and uses of reserves. The 
first definition is a purely theoretical definition of reserve money. Empirical determination of 
reserve money essentially originates in the second definition. (Another version of the second 
definition states that reserve money equals the sum of net domestic and foreign assets of the 
central bank). Finally, while commercial banks use reserves for maintaining required and 
excess reserves (including vault cash), they obtain the same either through acquiring 
government debt (unborrowed reserves) or loans from the central bank (borrowed reserves). 
The reserve equation categorizes monetary data in accordance with each of these definitions 
so that they all yield the same aggregate quantity. 
 
The Monetary Survey of the State Bank of Pakistan, while missing on elaborating the reserve 
related concepts and the reserve equation, defines reserve money in two equivalent ways (see 
State Bank of Pakistan 2002, 2005) as: 
SBPSBP NFANDAR +=            E-01 
VCRERRRRRRODCCR NBFITD ++++++=        E-02 
Tables 1 and 2 (see annexure) show the schematic balance sheets of the State Bank of 
Pakistan, issue and banking departments (see State Bank of Pakistan, 2002, 2005). 
                                                 
4  The standard balance sheet equation states that ‘Assets = Liabilities + Equity’. However, we seldom make 
such classification when dealing with the analytics of monetary policy in terms of central bank balance 
sheets; see Bindseil (2004) and Toporowski (2006). This type of classification is usually made for a central 
bank when dealing with the issue of central bank autonomy (e.g. Ernhagen et. al., 2002). 
 5
Aggregating the respective sides of these two balance sheets to form a consolidated balance 
sheet and then writing the result in the form of an equation, we get: 
OtherOtherGNBFIBanksNBFIBanksGBanking
BankingInternalBankingRBIRBIIssueIssueIssue
otherAllocationOBPFBanking
AsstIIIIAAAGDBSDR
BoPakSBoECAGSCSDRFG
LiabRevalBPaySDRDDDDCRFCC
++++++++++
++++++++++
=++++++++++
  E-03 
This equation may be manipulated (see Hassan and Shahzad, 2009 for details) to read: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) BankingotherOtherOtherNBFIBanks
OPFNBFIBanksGInternalGBankingIssue
SubsplusRBIRBI
CLiabRevalBPayCRFAsstIII
DDDAAAGDBBoEISS
ODCoinsCoinsBoPakASDRFGGR
−−−−−++++
−−−++++++++
++++++++= 1
  E-04 
where the bracketed terms may be identified respectively as the Gold Stock, Foreign 
Exchange Holdings of SBP, Treasury Currency, SBP’s Portfolio of Government Securities, 
SBP Credit (net of government deposits), SBP Investments and Other Balancing Items [See 
e.g. Mishkin, 2006; Federal Reserve Bank, 2002; Jordan, 1971]5. Equation E-04 provides a 
direct way of computing the quantity of reserve money using the balance sheets of the central 
bank. It tells us as to what assets denominate the outstanding quantity of reserve money in 
the economy and may thus, very adequately, be called the supply of reserve money6. The 
demand for reserve money arises out of its various uses by the non-bank private sector and 
the banking sector (hence called the uses of reserves), and can be determined as per equation 
E-027. 
 
The reserve equation is defined as the equation showing the sources and uses of reserve 
money. Equation E-02 describes the uses of reserve money. Standard definition of the 
sources of reserve money states that reserve money equals the sum of treasury currency ( ), TC
                                                 
5  The IMF’s Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual maintains that “Central bank or central government 
holdings of unissued or demonetized currency are not financial assets and should not be recorded in 
sectoral balance sheets” (International Monetary Fund, 2005). The last term in equation E-04 thus 
represents nothing else but a confusion of the State Bank of Pakistan regarding whether to include currency 
held in banking department as an asset of the issue department or not (see Hassan and Shahzad (2009) for a 
detailed discussion of this issue). In what follows, we construct different definitions of reserve money and 
accompanying data while assuming that this confusion does not exist. 
6  Since the sum of the first and second bracketed terms in E-04 represents SBP’s net foreign assets, therefore 
equation E-01 implies that the sum total of the remaining components must be SBP’s net domestic assets. 
7  The demand and supply of reserve money become equal only when we drop the last term (i.e. currency 
held in SBP’s Banking Department) from equation E-04. This proves the inaccuracy of SBP’s balance 
sheet data. 
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borrowed reserves ( RB ), unborrowed reserves ( ) and other balancing reserves (RU A ) (see 
Toporowski, 2006; Bindseil, 2004; Federal Reserve Bank, 2002; Teigen, 1978; Jordan, 1971): 
ARBRUCR T +++=           E-05  
Treasury currency is defined as currency issued by the federal government in the form of 
coins and other deposits. Unborrowed reserves equal the central bank’s portfolio of 
government securities plus total discounts and advances made by SBP less the borrowings of 
scheduled banks from SBP (Teigen, 1978); while borrowed reserves are defined as the total 
borrowings of scheduled banks from the central bank. The last term A  represents all other 
sources less all other uses and represents the maximum amount of resources that can be 
drained from the economy through defensive open market operations (see Teigen, 1978; 
Jordan, 1971). Defining net free reserves of the banking system as excess reserves (including 
vault cash) less borrowed reserves (see Teigen, 1978; Jordan, 1971), we can rewrite equation 
E-05 as: 
( ) AVCRERFRUC
ARBVCREVCRERUC
ARBRUCR
T
T
T
+++−+=
++−−+++=
+++=
        E-06 
In order to determine these variables empirically, we need to look at the consolidated balance 
sheets of the SBP and the commercial banks. Table 3 shows a schematic representation of the 
balance sheet of the scheduled banks in Pakistan. The balance sheet may be written in 
equation form as: 
xVCREBSIBCRRRRRBTD TD ++++++=++        E-07 
The banking system’s balance sheet identity states that the sum total of demand and time 
liabilities (  and D T ) plus the discount liabilities of the banking system ( RB ) equal required 
reserves against demand and time liabilities (  and ), bank credit ( ), banking 
sector investments ( ), excess reserves (
DRR TRR BC
BSI VCRE + ) and a balancing factor ( x ; all other 
assets less all other liabilities). The banking system’s balance sheet provides data on 
borrowed reserves8. The definition of treasury currency may be read directly from equation 
E-04 above. We are thus left to determine the quantity of unborrowed reserves and the factor 
A. In line with the definitions used by Federal Reserve Bank (2002), Teigen (1978) and 
                                                 
8  The category Loans and Advances to Banks and NBFI’s in the balance sheet of the State Bank of Pakistan 
somehow does not match the discount borrowings form SBP. 
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Jordan (1971), we define unborrowed reserves as the portfolio of government securities held 
at SBP, plus total discounts and advances made by State Bank of Pakistan (net of government 
deposits) less the borrowings of scheduled banks from SBP. Thus, adding together the fourth 
and fifth bracketed terms from equation E-04, and subtracting the amount of borrowed 
reserves from this total gives us an estimate of the amount of unborrowed reserves. 
( ) RB
DDD
AAAGDBBoE
ISSRU
OPF
NBFIBanksGInternal
GBankingIssue −⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−
+++++++=     E-089
Finally, subtracting treasury currency, unborrowed reserves and borrowed reserves from the 
total quantity of reserve money (equation E-05), we get data on the factor A  that represents 
all other sources less all other uses of reserves10. The reserve equation hence gets empirically 
determined. Combining the above results, we can write the complete reserve equation as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) AVCRERFRUCRVCRERRRRRRODCC TNBFITD +++−+≡≡++++++ E-09 
Canceling out excess reserves and vault cash on both sides, we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ARFRURRRRRRCODCC NBFITDT +−=+++−+       E-10 
Equation E-10 is the reserve equation. It provides an important link between currency in 
circulation, required reserves, unborrowed reserves and net free reserves of the banking 
system. The reserve equation is important because all of its variables are directly linked with 
monetary policy instruments. Required reserves are linked to the reserve requirement ratios 
and the volume of demand deposits. Changes in unborrowed reserves take place through 
open market operations and are therefore related to the t-bill rate. Finally, net free reserves of 
the banking system have a very close relationship with the interest rate differential (money 
market rate less the discount rate) and deposits of the banking system. Monetary policy, 
                                                 
9  The State Bank of Pakistan publishes data on borrowed reserves (advances from State Bank of Pakistan), 
excess reserves, vault cash (cash in tills of banks), one rupee and above coins, subsidiary coins and other 
deposits. The volume of treasury currency, borrowed reserves and free reserves is therefore known with 
certainty. However, the data on unborrowed reserves is not published in readily usable format. We derive it 
using the definition in E-08. To the extent that unborrowed reserves are over/under estimated (because of 
non-availability of further disaggregated data that may need a re-categorization), the factor A will need to 
be counter adjusted. However, we expect that this adjustment would be of a much smaller magnitude to 
make any significant analytical differences for our analysis.  
10  Using E-04, E-06 and E-08, we get:  
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−−−
++++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+
+++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +=
Other
OtherOthersNBFIBanks
RBIRBI LiabvalReBPayCRF
AsstIII
BoPakA
SDRF
G
G
A ' . This clearly shows that the term A 
represents net foreign assets of the central bank plus its investments (net of capital gains, other liabilities 
etc.) and, therefore, is the maximum amount of resources that can be drained out of the monetary system 
through defensive open market (sterilization) operations.  
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whether it works through open market or discount operations (in the short run) or through 
reserve requirement setting (in the long run) can therefore be directly evaluated by making 
use of this identity. 
 
II (B) Reserve Equation and the Analytics of Monetary Policy 
The various definitions of money supply used by the State Bank of Pakistan read: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
NFANDA
NFANCONCPSNCGS
DODCCRFCDTDDDODCCM p
+=
+++=
++=++++=2
       E-11 
The reserve equation (E-10) and the demand definition of money supply (first part of E-11) 
together with the assumptions that (i) the ratio of currency (including other deposits) to 
money supply is stable and predictable and that (ii) required reserves are linked to deposits 
via the reserve requirement ratio, generate the definition of the reserve multiplier. Defining 
( ) 2MODCC +=η , and ( ) 21 MDRR P ηϕϕ −=⋅= , we can write this relationship as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) RFACRURFACRUM TT ⋅−++⋅=−++⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−+= µµηϕη 1
1
2   
   E-12 
The money supply model in equation E-12, links money supply (  to the reserve 
multiplier (
)2M
)µ  and the reserve components, and simultaneously breaks money supply into its 
endogenous and exogenous components. Since the quantity of unborrowed reserves and 
treasury currency is directly under the control of the system and since A  can always be 
effectively drained out of the system through defensive open market operations, therefore the 
first term represents the purely exogenous part of money supply. The second component is 
the net free reserves of the banking system and represents the endogenous part of money 
supply (Teigen, 1978; Branson, 1989). The central bank usually controls free reserves 
through its discount and standing facilities operations. Proponents of the reserve approach to 
money supply believe that once the quantity of unborrowed and free reserves is determined, 
the level of private deposits can be determined residually by making use of the expression: 
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ARFRURR ∆+∆−∆=∆ 11 . The ratio of unborrowed reserves and free reserves to total 
private deposits, therefore, describes nothing else but monetary policy. 
 
Finally, using equations E-01 and the last component of E-11, and defining 
SBPD NDANDAm =  and SBPF NFANFAm =  as the domestic and foreign asset money 
multipliers, we can write the overall money multiplier ( )RMm 2=  as FFDD mmm δδ ⋅+⋅= , 
where the δ ’s reflect the respective shares of domestic and foreign assets in reserve money. 
Since the numerator on the right hand side of equation E-12 equals reserve money less 
excess reserves, therefore, we expect the reserve multiplier ( )µ  to be larger than the simple 
money multiplier (  and the true descriptor of how much credit can the banking system 
generate from a given volume of reserve money.  
)m
 
III. STATISTICAL COMPUTATIONS & ANALYSIS  
Drawing upon the data on the balance sheets of the State Bank of Pakistan, the consolidated 
balance sheet of the commercial banks, monetary statistics and monetary survey, we 
construct data on the various components of the sources and uses of reserve money for the 
Pakistan economy using the above definitions over the period 1975-2009. All data has been 
taken from the Handbook of Statistics on Pakistan Economy 2005 and the Annual Reports 
(2006, 2007 and 2008) of State Bank of Pakistan, and counter-checked from the Monthly 
Bulletins of State Bank of Pakistan and the various Economic Surveys. Results of the 
statistical computations are provided in Table No.5. The computed data series are then used 
to construct the time profile of a number of reserve indicators (derived in section II above), 
the graphs of which are plotted in the figures following the data tables. 
 
                                                 
11  This identity is the total differential of equation E-10 while holding currency in circulation constant. The 
differentials appearing in the expression are behaviorally related to the bank deposits and the various 
interest rates, thereby also getting cross linked to one another. Thus, e.g., when free reserves or unborrowed 
reserves change, they also cause a change in bank deposits exerting a second round indirect influence on 
required reserves (see Meigs, 1962) for a detailed discussion of these concepts). Casting out all of these 
differentials in terms of their relationship with bank deposits and then inverting this functional relationship, 
we get the result that bank deposits are residually determined through this identity. Clark and Kwack (1976) 
also derive the same result in a slightly different context. 
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Table nos. 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate our computed data series showing, respectively, the supply 
and demand components of reserve money. While table 5(a) corresponds to our 
categorization of the SBP’s balance sheet data in accordance with equation E-04, table 5(b) 
is simply a reprint of different data series from the sources listed above. Table 5(c) illustrates 
data on the sources of reserve money constructed in concordance with equation E-06. This 
completes one part of the tasks that we set ourselves in this paper. This data set is then used 
to construct the time profile of the unborrowed, free and drainable reserve ratios, the ratio of 
broad money to unborrowed reserves, the endogenous and exogenous components of reserve 
money, the total volume of discretionary open market operation instruments along with its 
growth rate, the difference between the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios in 
comparison with the t-bill rate, the reserve multiplier in comparison with the simple money 
multiplier, the breakup of the simple money multiplier into its domestic and foreign 
components, and the growth rate of unborrowed reserves alongside the rate of inflation. The 
graphs are sufficient evidence to the fact that the SBP is doing much that is unneeded and 
neglecting a lot while making monetary policy. 
 
First and foremost, the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios are mirror images of each 
other. This means that the State Bank of Pakistan carries out open market operations only to 
counter-balance changes in the factor A . Since A  consists of foreign assets of the SBP and 
its investments in banks and NBFI’s (net of factors that reflect its profitability), therefore the 
essential conclusion is that the SBP carries out open market operations to balance these 
changes and its own business initiatives. The volume of open market operations thus 
becomes endogenous to the system. It therefore appears to be a historical fact, and essentially 
in this accounting context only, that changes in t-bill rate are not reflective of SBP’s 
monetary policy. 
 
The SBP’s motivation for carrying out open market operations also seems quite 
unconvincing. The SBP defines its net foreign assets as the sum total of first and second 
bracketed terms in equation E-04 less some components of Other Deposits (see State Bank of 
Pakistan, 2005). The definition makes it clear that the SBP’s foreign assets are earned 
reserves and not borrowed collateral (see Dooley and Garber, 2005 for details of these 
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concepts). In a subsequent paper, we show that the control over domestic asset expansion 
requires the central bank to offset changes not in its own net foreign assets (which are earned 
reserves) but the net foreign assets of commercial banks including deposits of other 
government’s, the country’s net position at the IMF etc. but excluding their foreign bills12. 
Since the strategy of SBP’s open market operations reclines in counter balancing its own net 
foreign assets, therefore it becomes obvious that the SBP is deeply concerned with managing 
the exchange rate, quite in contrast with its publicly held opinion that it is not doing so. 
 
To demonstrate the flaw of this strategy, we compare the simple money multiplier with the 
reserve multiplier. We find that the difference between the two multipliers averaged at 0.3 
before 1991 and at approximately 0.7 since then. One is thus forced to believe that the 
foreign currency denominated private deposit accounts allowed in 1991 have something to do 
with this difference. Mirakhor and Zaidi (2004) observe that as per SBP policy requirement, 
commercial banks are required to sell the foreign exchange deposited with them to SBP at a 
premium at the end of each working day. This implies that the SBP supplies extra short term 
excess reserves for the banking system, thereby enabling them to disburse more credit if and 
when required than would otherwise be possible for the banking system. Thus, while the SBP 
continues to believe that the banking system can transform every rupee of reserve money into 
(about) three rupees of broad money, the banking system actually translates it into four 
rupees13. The open market operations strategy of the SBP lends further support to this 
endogenous credit expansion. Comparing the domestic and the foreign asset components of 
the money multiplier, we find that the former is much larger in magnitude as compared to the 
latter. Still, the SBP is more concerned with draining away these foreign assets (as discussed 
above) rather than mopping away domestic liquidity. The domestic asset multiplier averaged 
at a value of 4 between 1991 and 2002. The same increased to an average value of 17 
                                                 
12  This idea has been fully elucidated in the author’s dissertation. The historical origins of the same can be 
traced back to the concept of the liquidity definition of balance of payments. Some useful discussions of the 
same can be found in McKinnon (1969) and Knoester (1979).  
13  The primary factor underlying this difference happens to be the way excess reserves are accounted for by 
the monetary authority and the monetary system. While the monetary authority needs to add excess 
reserves to form the reserve money aggregate (equation E-02), the monetary system treats excess reserves 
(net of discount borrowings) as a crunch on its reserve base (equations E-09 and E-10). Thus reserve 
money increases in volume as excess reserves increase, but the reserve base of the banking system shrinks 
and hence a quantitatively larger multiplier value is obtained (the close association between the difference 
of the two multipliers and the free reserve to deposit ratio supports this intuition). 
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(peaking at a value of 30 in 2003) between 2003 and 2007. On the other hand, the foreign 
asset multiplier remained a fractional value averaging at 0.80 (peaking at a value of 1.06 in 
2007) during the entire 2003-07 period. The open market operations of the SBP, thus, 
encourage long run rent seeking by the commercial banking sector thereby providing 
endogenous support to inflation.  
Next, the total volume of discretionary open market instruments (sum total of unborrowed 
plus drainable reserves) as a ratio of total private deposits shows a declining trend ever since 
financial liberalization in 1991. The monetary system thus appears to have some historical 
preoccupation with not making open market operation instruments the primary tool of 
monetary policy. The growth rate of the same variable happens to be strongly negatively 
correlated with the rate of inflation (the correlation coefficient between the two is -0.6 over 
the period 1999-2000 to 2006-07). The recent inflation episode that took pace at the end of 
2005 can therefore be entirely attributed as a failure of monetary policy. To add substance to 
this argument, we note that the level of unborrowed reserves (as percent of total private 
deposits) started declining in 1999-2000 and became negative in 2002-03, stayed negative 
until 2004-05, became positive again in 2005-06 only to continue declining again (in fact, the 
difference between unborrowed and drainable reserves is negative since 1999-2000). This 
indicates that the monetary system was providing excessive liquidity in the form of discount 
loans to the commercial banks. This event corresponds to a similar situation that the US 
economy has recently witnessed when the financial turmoil led to unborrowed reserves going 
negative marking the beginning of an inflation episode. The SBP has always asserted that 
Pakistan has no signs of being hit by financial turmoil like the USA and Euro zone did in 
2007-08. The data, however, speak contrary to all that. 
 
That the SBP’s open market operations strategy derives from some ill-founded concerns 
becomes evident when we look at the graph that shows the difference between the 
unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios along side the t-bill rate. The difference between the 
unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios indicates nothing else but optimal open market 
operations (see Toporowski, 2006). Hence, we expect the t-bill rate to be the replica of this 
graph. However, we find that at the SBP, the two become same only when we plot the lagged 
value of the t-bill rate (which is an annual average) alongside the reserve difference. The 
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monetary policy strategy at the SBP is thus seen to be lagging behind in time, indicating 
again that the bank takes about six month’s time to know what is happening in the economy 
and the money market. Viewed from another perspective, since the t-bill rate does not match 
the difference between the unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios in the current time period, 
therefore, monetary policy may well be identified as time inconsistent (this may be one 
interpretation of why the output coefficient in our estimated Taylor rule equation is negative). 
 
The unabated conclusions that this discussion points to, is that the SBP is (i) speciously using 
open market operations to balance changes in earned foreign exchange assets and its own 
business initiatives, thereby trivializing the t-bill rate, (ii) fabricating a time-inconsistent 
monetary policy owing to a one year lag in taking the t-bill rate to its optimal level, (iii) 
preoccupied with not using open market operations as the core monetary policy instrument, 
(iii) has no clear conception as to how this links to the formation of inflation expectations, 
hence, (iv) disowns inflation and its control14. 
 
As to the answer to what the State Bank of Pakistan’s monetary policy is about, we find that 
prior to 1999-2000 the ratio of broad money to unborrowed reserves fluctuated around 4.6% 
of total private deposits, while since 2000-01 onwards, the State Bank is managing to keep 
the net free reserves of the banking system closely fluctuating around 4% of total private 
deposits. Both these strategies of monetary policy have been demonstrated to be inconsistent 
a long time ago even by the proponents of the reserve position doctrine. Free reserves were 
known to be an improper target of monetary policy ever since the 1960’s. Unborrowed 
reserves were demonstrated to be improper target of policy both on account of the 
implementation complexities involved in the process and because of the wide swings in 
                                                 
14  The ultimate control over inflation and currency depreciation comes from the answer as to how costly it is 
for the system to increase any (or both) of them. These costs are leveraged by the levels of domestic public 
debt holdings and external reserves. Thus, for example, if the government holds a large volume of 
outstanding public debt, inflation would be very costly in that it will eventually increase the service cost of 
this debt to the government. Similarly, a large volume of external indebtedness (or foreign reserve holdings) 
will make currency depreciation difficult for the central bank, because it would then increase its service 
costs (or reduce the value of reserves) over and above the expected gains from increased exports. It follows 
that a strategy of increasing the exogenous component of money supply and accumulating foreign 
exchange reserves is sufficient to induce control over inflation and the currency exchange rate. The falling 
level of the sum of unborrowed and drainable reserves (which constitute the exogenous component of 
money supply) is therefore evidence to the fact that the State Bank of Pakistan and the government both are 
absolutely hesitant to control inflation. 
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interest rates produced by it (see Bindseil, 2004 for a review of when a certain reserve 
aggregate was used as a policy guide by the Fed and how and why it failed). Recounting 
upon Meigs’ arguments about free reserves to be false indicators of the reserve pressure and 
on the practical failure of the 1979 Fed policy move15 (see Meigs, 1962; Poole, 1982), we 
find that the SBP’s spontaneous strategy of monetary policy is quiet disoriented16. In fact, 
since the SBP has never explicitly stated that it is engaged with targeting free reserves of the 
banking system, we can well infer (in the light of the arguments of Brunner and Meltzer 
(1964), Poole (1968), Bindseil (2004), Bindseil and Würtz (2007) and Gavin (2007)) that 
SBP is actually using the discount rate as an anchor for conducting monetary policy17. The 
steady state value of this anchor does not derive from any known estimates of the 
productivity of the domestic capital stock. Rather, its value is kept close to the t-bill rate, and 
not contrariwise (because announcements regarding the discount rate are always 
accommodative and have lagged behind changes in the inter-bank money market rate, only to 
allow more room for its variability; see SBP’s various monetary policy statements at 
http://www.sbp.org.pk), which itself derives from some concern with managing the nominal 
exchange rate. This implies that the true descriptor of SBP’s monetary policy is the t-bill rate, 
which is but incorrectly related with inflation and output levels. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper dealt with the computation and analysis of some fundamental reserve aggregates 
and associated monetary statistics that the SBP does not publish or take into account but 
which impart important information regarding the design and conduct of monetary policy at 
the SBP. Specifically, we computed the data series for borrowed, unborrowed, free and 
                                                 
15  Meigs argued that (i) a given level of free reserves may be associated with different levels of money growth 
and deposit expansion, (ii) equal volumes of free reserves in different periods do not imply same bank 
behavior, (iii) changes in free reserve levels are inappropriate indicators of tight/easy monetary policy, and 
(iv) free reserves targets are self defeating (see Meigs, 1962 for details) 
16  We call this strategy spontaneous because the State Bank of Pakistan has never explained as to whether any 
of these reserves, unborrowed or free, are inelastic or contrariwise (as suggested by Gordon and Leeper 
(1997)) to the corresponding rate of interest. In fact, since the t-bill rate was constant during the 1980’s and 
only a white noise averaging at 12.5 percent during 1990’s therefore unborrowed reserve were perfectly 
elastic to the rate of interest. Similarly, the net free reserves ratio appears to be positively correlated with 
the discount rate since 2001. 
17  The recent monetary policy statement (State Bank of Pakistan, 2009b) thus, did not announce anything new 
about monetary policy. It only made explicit whatever the State Bank of Pakistan was previously doing 
without announcing it. 
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drainable reserves using balance sheet data published by the State Bank of Pakistan for the 
period 1985-2009 with a view towards the empirical determination of the reserve equation 
for Pakistan. These data series were then used to analyze the strategy of monetary policy at 
the SBP. 
 
We find that (a) the operational target for carrying out monetary operations at the State Bank 
of Pakistan happens to be a free reserves target since 2000-01, which, interpreted in the light 
of the fundamental equation of monetary policy and the various monetary policy statements 
of the SBP, is equivalent to using the discount rate as the policy anchor, whose value, in turn, 
derives from the t-bill rate, (b) the scope of open market operations as a tool of monetary 
policy remains but limited, owing to the declining trend in the sum total of drainable and 
unborrowed reserves (which equals the volume of discretionary open market instruments and 
also represents the exogenous component of broad money supply) held at the SBP, (c) even 
this limited role of open market defenses derives from the indiscreet concern of the SBP to 
sterilize its own earned foreign exchange reserves rather than the unearned foreign exchange 
assets of the banking system. This reflects in the unborrowed and drainable reserves being 
mirror images of each other. Since this observation also implies that the source of open 
market operations lies in SBP’s foreign asset accumulation (inter-alia), one may conclude 
(and as the Governor recently did) that the t-bill rate is endogenous to the monetary system. 
In fact, this is a mere restatement of the fact that open market operations derive from the 
concern with managing the exchange rate. Furthermore, (d) the limited scope and indiscreet 
concern regarding the conduct of open market operations is sub-optimally distributed in time 
whereby the t-bill rate lags behind its optimal value by about six months to one year and 
renders monetary policy time inconsistent, (e) the growth rate of unborrowed plus drainable 
reserves bears a strong negative correlation with the annual average rate of inflation, which, 
on account of the former being consistently negative since 2005, implies that the government 
and the State Bank of Pakistan both have absolutely no concern for controlling inflation. 
 
The conclusions recounted above imply that the State Bank of Pakistan’s monetary policy 
revolves around managing the exchange rate. The key policy instrument for implementing 
this strategy happens to be the t-bill rate, which also guides the State Bank of Pakistan in 
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setting the discount rate. Two independent observations; the policy rule equation and the 
difference between unborrowed and drainable reserve ratios, suggest that value of this 
instrument is but incorrectly set. This finding, combined with the presence of a significant 
Laursen-Meltzer effect in face of the fact that the exogenous component of broad money is 
continuously declining, implies that the State Bank of Pakistan is responsible for the ongoing 
inflation episode. 
 
REFERENCES 
1. Bernanke, B. S., (2004), “Inflation Targeting”, Panel Discussion, Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis Review, July/August 2004.  
2. Bindseil, U. and F. Würtz, (2007), “Open Market Operations: Their Role and 
Specification Today”, in Open Market Operations and Financial Markets, edited by 
David G. Mayes and Jan Toporowski (2007), Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 
New York. 
3. Bindseil, U., (2004), “The Operational Target of Monetary Policy and the Rise and Fall 
of Reserve Position Doctrine”, European Central Bank Working Paper Series, No. 372, 
June 2004. 
4. Branson, William H., (1989), “Macroeconomic Theory & Policy”, 3rd Edition, Harper 
& Row, 1989. 
5. Brunner, Karl and Allan H. Meltzer, (1964) “The Federal Reserve’s Attachment to the 
Free Reserve Concept” House Committee on Banking and Currency, 1964, Washington 
D.C., Reprinted in Monetary Economics, ed. Karl Brunner and A. H. Meltzer. London, 
Blackwell, 1989. 
6. Clarida, R., J. Gali and M. Gertler, (2000), “Monetary policy rules and macroeconomic 
stability: Evidence and some theory”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115 (1), 
147-180. 
7. Clark, Peter and S. Kwack, (1976), “Asset markets and interest rate determination in 
the multi-country model”, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, International Finance 
Discussion Papers, No. 94, 1976. 
8. Dooley, Michael and Peter Garber, (2005), “Is it 1958 or 1968? Three Notes on the 
Longevity of the Revived Bretton Woods System”, Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 1(2005), 147 – 209. 
9. Ernhagen, T., M. Vesterlund and S. Viotti, (2002), “How much Equity Does a Central 
Bank Need”, Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, (2), 2002, 5-17. 
10. Favero, C. A. and R. Rovelli, (2001), “Macroeconomic Stability and the Performance 
of the Fed: A Formal Analysis 1961-98”, IGIER Universita Bocconi Working Paper. 
 17
11. Federal Reserve Bank (2002), “Federal Reserve Balance Sheet and Reserve Equation”, 
in “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions”, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve, 2002. 
12. Gavin, W. T., (2007), “Comments on Open Market Operations: Their Role and 
Specification Today”, in Open Market Operations and Financial Markets, edited by 
David G. Mayes and Jan Toporowski (2007), Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 
New York. 
13. Gordon, David B. and Eric M. Leeper (1997), “The Dynamic Impacts of Monetary 
Policy: An Exercise in Tentative Identification”, The Journal of Political Economy, 
102(6), Dec 1994, 1228-1247. 
14. Guttentag, J. M., (1966), “The Strategy of Open Market Operations”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 80 (1), 1-30. 
15. Hassan, R. and M. M. Shahzad, (2010), “A Macroeconometric Framework for 
Monetary Policy Evaluation: A Case Study of Pakistan”, Economic Modelling, 2010. 
doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2010.09.018. 
16. Hassan, R. and M. M. Shahzad, (2010), “An Essential Correction in the Measurement 
of Currency in Circulation and Reserve Money”, submitted for publication to journal of 
Social Sciences, University of Karachi, 2010. 
17. International Monetary Fund, (2005), “Monetary and Financial Statistics Manual”, 
International Monetary Fund, Chapter 4, p2. 
18. Jordan, Jerry L., (1969), “Elements of Money Stock Determination”, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Illinois. 
19. Knoester, Anthony, (1979), “On Monetary and Fiscal Policy in an Open Economy”, De 
Economist, 127(1) March 1979, 105-142. 
20. Malik, Waseem S. and Athar M. Ahmad, (2007), “The Taylor Rule and 
Macroeconomic Performance in Paksitan”, PIDE Working Papers Series, No. 34, 2007, 
http://www.pide.org.pk. 
21. Mayes, David G. and Jan Toporowski (2007), Open Market Operations and Financial 
Markets, (edited), Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, New York, 2007. 
22. McKinnon, Ronald I., (1969), “Private and Official International Money: The Case for 
the Dollar”, Essays in International Finance, No. 74, Princeton University.  
23. Meigs, A. James (1962), “Free Reserves and the Money Supply”, University of Chicago 
Press, 1962. 
24. Mirakhor, Abbas and Iqbal Zaidi, (2004), “Foreign Currency Deposits and International 
Liquidity Shortages in Pakistan,” IMF Working Paper No. 04/167, September 2004, 
Washington, International Monetary Fund. 
25. Mishkin, Frederic S., (2006), “The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial 
Markets”, 8th Edition, Addison-Wesley, 2006. 
 18
26. Poole, William H., (1968), “Commercial Bank Reserve Management in a Stochastic 
Model: Implications for Monetary Policy,” Journal of Finance 23 (December 1968), 
769-791. 
27. Rudebusch, G. D. and L. E. Svensson, (1998), “Policy Rules for Inflation Targeting”, 
Paper Presented at NBER Conference on Monetary Policy Rules, February 1998. 
28. State Bank of Pakistan, (2002), “Monetary Survey Manual”, Research Department, 
State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi.  
29. State Bank of Pakistan, (2005), “Monetary Survey Manual (Revised)”, Research 
Department, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi. 
30. State Bank of Pakistan, (2009a), “Annual Report 2008-2009: Volume I”, Research 
Department, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi. 
31. State Bank of Pakistan, (2009b), “Monetary Policy Statement July – September 2009”, 
http://www.sbp.org.pk/m_policy/MPD-24-Nov-09(English).pdf, State Bank of Pakistan, 
2009. 
32. Taylor, J. B. (1998), “The Explanatory Power of Monetary Policy Rules”, NBER 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13685, http://www.nber.org/papers/w13685. 
33. Taylor, J. B., (1993), “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice” Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 39, pp. 195–214. 
34. Teigen, Ronald, L., (1978), “Readings in Money, National Income and Stabilization 
Policy”, 4th Edition, Richard D. Irwin Inc., Illinois, 1978. 
35. Toporowski, Jan, (2006), “Open market operations: beyond The New Consensus”, 
Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers, 14:2006. 
 
 19
SCHEMATIC BALANCE SHEETS OF STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN 
 
 
 
TABLE NO.1   SCHEMATIC BALANCE SHEET OF SBP (ISSUE DEPARTMENT) 
LIABILITIES ASSETS 
Gold Coins and Bullion 
Sterling Securities Currency Held in SBP (Banking Department) 
 Government of India 
Securities 
Approved Foreign 
Exchange 
India Notes 
Unutilized Allocation of SDR ’s Notes in Circulation (Five Rupee & Above bills Issued) 
Rupee Coin/ Notes 
  Govt. of Pakistan Securities 
  
Domestic Assets 
Internal Bills of Exchange 
and Commercial Papers 
  Gold Coins and Bullion 
  Sterling Securities 
  Government of India Securities 
  
Assets with RBI Pending 
Transfer to Pakistan 
Rupee Coins 
SOURCE: State Bank of Pakistan (2005)   
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SCHEMATIC BALANCE SHEETS OF STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN 
 
 
TABLE NO. 2  SCHEMATIC BALANCE SHEET OF SBP (BANKING DEPARTMENT) 
LIABILITIES ASSETS 
Paid-up Capital Notes and Coins Held in SBP (Banking Department) 
Capital and Reserves 
Reserve Fund Internal Bills of Exchange 
Deposits of Federal 
Government 
Bills Purchased and 
Discounted Government Treasury Bills 
Deposits of Provincial 
Government 
Balances Held outside 
Pakistan 
Deposits of Banks 
Foreign Exchange 
SDR Held with IMF 
Deposits 
Other Deposits at SBP Government Debtor Balance 
Allocation of SDR ’s by IMF 
Advances to Government 
Loans and Advances to 
Government 
Bills Payable Loans and Advances to Scheduled Banks  
Revaluation Account Loans & Advances to  NBFI ’s  
Other Liabilities Scheduled Banks 
 NBFI ’s  
 Government Securities 
 
Investments of SBP in 
Other Assets 
 Other Fixed Assets 
SOURCE: State Bank of Pakistan (2005)            
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SCHEMATIC BALANCE SHEETS OF BANKING SECTOR 
 
TABLE NO. 3  SCHEMATIC BALANCE SHEET OF BANKING SECTOR 
LIABILITIES ASSETS 
Capital Paid-up and Reserves On Demand Liabilities 
Borrowing 
Statutory Reserves 
On Time Liabilities 
Inter-Bank 
Deposits Cash in Pakistan 
Deposits General Balances with SBP 
Demand 
Liabilities in 
Pakistan Others 
Deposits Other Other Balances 
Borrowings 
Balances In Pakistan 
Money at Call & Short 
Notice in Pakistan Inter-Bank 
Deposits Held in Pakistan 
Deposits General Balances with Banks Abroad 
Time Liabilities 
in Pakistan 
Others 
Other Deposits 
Foreign Currency 
 
Borrowings from State Bank of Pakistan To Banks 
Borrowings from Banks Abroad 
Advances 
To Others 
Money at Call and Short notice in Pakistan 
Bank Credit 
Bills Purchased & 
Discounted 
Other Liabilities Federal Govt. Securities 
 Provincial Govt. Securities 
 Treasury Bills 
 
Investment In Securities & 
Shares 
Others 
 Other Assets 
 Advance Tax Paid 
 Fixed Assets 
SOURCE: State Bank of Pakistan (2005)  
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
 
TABLE NO. 4  LIST OF ACRONYMS USED IN PAPER 
 SYMBOL DESCRIPTION SYMBOL DESCRIPTION 
C  Notes in Circulation (Currency Issued) InternalBoE  
Internal Bills of Exchange and 
Commercial Papers 
BankingC  Currency Held in SBP (Banking Department) RBIG  Gold Coin & Bullion with RBI 
CRF  Capital and Reserves RBIA  Other Assets with RBI 
FD  Deposits of Federal Government 
PD  Deposits of Provincial Government 
BankingS  
Bills Purchased & Discounted 
(Internal Bills of Exchange and 
Government T Bills) 
DoB  Deposits of Banks BoPak  Balances Held outside Pakistan 
OD  Other Deposits at SBP BankingSDR  SDR Held with IMF 
AllocationSDR  Allocation of SDR ’s by IMF GDB  Government Debtor Balance 
BPay  Bills Payable GA  Loans and Advances to Government 
Reval  Revaluation Account BanksA  
Loans and Advances to Scheduled 
Banks 
otherLiab  Other Liabilities NBFIA  Loans & Advances NBFI ’s 
G  Gold Coins and Bullion BanksI  Investment in Scheduled Banks 
F  Approved Foreign Exchange NBFII  Investment in NBFI ’s 
IssueSDR  Unutilized Allocation of SDR ’s GI  Investment in Government Securities 
IssueC  Rupee Coin/ Notes OtherI  Other Investments 
IssueS  Govt. of Pakistan Securities OtherAsst  Other Fixed Assets 
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RESERVE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS 
 
TABLE NO. 5(A) RESERVE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS (SUPPLY) 
  Gold Stock  
Foreign 
Exchange of 
SBP 
Treasury 
Currency 
SBP's Portfolio of 
Government Securities 
SBP 
Credit 
Government 
Deposits at SBP 
Other Balancing 
Items 
Reserve 
Money 
1985 9,661.60  6,558.10  2,937.00 66,879.70 29,543.10  29,645.50 (15,684.20) 70,249.80 
1986 11,276.80  12,008.10  3,110.00 68,552.50 37,238.20  34,573.70 (19,412.40) 78,199.70 
1987 15,052.40  11,218.40  3,359.00 76,342.80 45,308.30  31,557.50 (19,504.10) 100,219.50 
1988 15,286.50  4,367.40  3,520.00 82,114.80 53,005.70  30,209.20 (19,924.90) 108,160.70 
1989 15,342.20  5,729.60  5,877.00 90,110.60 58,919.20  35,475.50 (18,544.90) 121,958.80 
1990 14,960.30  9,175.90  4,968.00 110,990.40 65,449.40  46,809.40 (18,081.30) 140,655.20 
1991 17,448.70  8,951.20  5,892.00 119,695.20 84,499.20  45,222.50 (21,384.10) 169,879.90 
1992 17,443.10  20,401.80  6,517.00 173,778.50 77,460.80  65,101.50 (22,206.40) 208,293.50 
1993 20,841.80  6,647.30  7,663.00 198,513.10 93,975.10  71,345.90 (32,436.60) 223,858.10 
1994 24,296.50  63,164.60  8,987.00 188,715.60 95,957.10  89,418.80 (32,905.30) 258,797.10 
1995 24,663.20  77,697.30  8,331.00 212,563.20 111,539.20  79,872.00 (48,931.90) 305,989.40 
1996 27,566.90  63,989.40  10,079.00 240,450.00 90,013.90  81,487.40 (40,531.70) 310,080.70 
1997 27,970.50  37,201.30  10,360.00 288,496.20 112,921.20  89,869.80 (40,033.60) 347,046.20 
1998 28,291.20  32,997.80  9,677.00 253,189.90 148,589.80  99,394.30 (3,872.90) 369,478.80 
1999 28,067.00  78,408.60  9,428.00 381,913.50 197,865.80  227,441.10 (70,258.10) 397,983.80 
2000 31,508.10  59,715.90  11,217.00 573,371.20 220,666.50  323,991.60 (74,679.70) 497,807.60 
2001 36,199.20  132,612.20  14,726.00 618,890.50 201,292.70  498,613.10 28,094.20 533,201.40 
2002 40,020.30  287,586.10  17,567.00 328,592.80 179,238.00  327,154.70 58,749.40 584,599.00 
2003 41,918.20  576,935.30  8,165.00 110,390.80 157,971.30  355,360.00 129,459.80 669,480.50 
2004 48,305.20  645,544.70  7,721.00 133,274.90 188,703.00  310,451.70 59,771.70 772,868.90 
2005 54,746.20  625,039.10  10,115.00 331,273.10 208,092.30  366,468.30 46,378.60 909,176.20 
2006 77,557.70  689,674.80  12,529.00 516,661.20 224,235.50  410,494.60 (108,689.30) 1,001,473.70 
2007 82,598.00  850,521.10  15,120.00 460,752.70 278,350.30  408,415.90 (68,357.20) 1,210,569.10 
2008 124,607.70  612,461.00  12,595.00 1,042,646.20 240,270.30  428,693.30 (215,431.40) 1,388,455.70 
2009 166,246.60  755,208.70  13,012.00 1,199,879.70 379,973.20  747,727.50 (258,791.50) 1,507,801.10 
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RESERVE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS  
 
TABLE NO. 5(B) RESERVE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS (DEMAND / USES) 
  Currency in Circulation 
Other 
Deposits 
Required Reserves 
(DD) 
Required 
Reserves (TD) 
Deposits of 
NBFI's 
Excess 
Reserves Vault Cash Reserve Money 
1985 56,701.70  742.00 3,674.26 3,691.65 (825.80) 2,178.89 4,087.10 70,249.80 
1986 63,293.90  878.00 4,269.63 4,721.71 (1,922.80) 2,811.36 4,147.90 78,199.70 
1987 74,765.50  1,102.00 4,722.42 5,370.64 (2,348.40) 11,984.15 4,623.20 100,219.50 
1988 87,856.40  1,218.00 5,492.49 5,762.18 (2,419.60) 5,116.43 5,134.80 108,160.70 
1989 97,996.80  3,132.00 6,035.63 6,171.27 (3,110.50) 6,749.91 4,983.70 121,958.80 
1990 115,523.30  2,209.00 7,275.60 7,396.30 (3,574.10) 6,474.10 5,351.00 140,655.20 
1991 136,999.40  3,114.00 8,533.25 9,196.25 (2,582.50) 7,280.50 7,339.00 169,879.90 
1992 152,236.40  3,322.00 10,693.15 11,469.35 (5,053.90) 26,664.50 8,962.00 208,293.50 
1993 166,864.90  4,449.00 12,311.45 13,960.00 (7,501.80) 22,473.55 11,301.00 223,858.10 
1994 184,928.10  5,506.00 14,500.95 17,718.05 (9,342.00) 31,527.00 13,959.00 258,797.10 
1995 215,579.60  5,055.00 16,918.80 20,916.45 (9,511.20) 40,667.75 16,363.00 305,989.40 
1996 234,110.10  6,791.00 18,999.15 25,296.15 (13,650.40) 19,206.70 19,328.00 310,080.70 
1997 244,140.90  7,135.00 19,960.15 29,118.25 (11,806.70) 40,677.60 17,821.00 347,046.20 
1998 272,922.90  6,412.00 22,762.00 32,293.75 (13,365.10) 29,684.25 18,769.00 369,478.80 
1999 287,716.90  6,212.00 25,902.95 33,918.15 (15,150.10) 40,513.90 18,870.00 397,983.80 
2000 355,677.80  7,959.00 28,687.50 33,466.90 (38,668.20) 91,216.60 19,468.00 497,807.60 
2001 375,465.80  11,292.00 30,655.85 36,358.85 (20,696.40) 80,947.30 19,178.00 533,201.40 
2002 433,815.90  13,847.00 35,106.40 40,933.05 (14,360.90) 48,843.55 26,414.00 584,599.00 
2003 494,576.80  3,499.00 43,858.65 46,158.20 912.70 50,060.15 30,415.00 669,480.50 
2004 578,116.70  2,116.00 55,985.65 52,621.40 4,798.20 42,798.95 36,432.00 772,868.90 
2005 666,056.90  3,355.00 66,350.85 63,489.45 8,210.30 58,251.70 43,462.00 909,176.20 
2006 740,529.40  4,931.00 72,363.85 76,220.90 5,073.30 53,916.25 48,439.00 1,001,473.70 
2007 848,773.50  7,012.00 211,867.46 17,470.53 (2,264.40) 78,095.01 58,072.00 1,210,569.10 
2008 986,793.70  4,261.00 316,878.48 0.00 (85,662.70) 97,219.52 68,966.00 1,388,455.70 
2009 1,160,536.20  4,662.00 184,586.15 0.00 (12,835.10) 93,845.85 77,006.00 1,507,801.10 
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RESERVE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS 
TABLE NO. 5(C) RESERVE MONEY AND ITS COMPONENTS (SOURCES) 
Discretionary Open Market 
Instruments   Treasury Currency 
Borrowed 
Reserves 
Unborrowed 
Reserves 
Drainable 
Reserves 
Excess 
Reserves Vault Cash 
Net Free 
Reserves Reserve Money 
1985 2,937.00  18,065.30 48,712.00 535.50 2,178.89  4,087.10 (11,799.31) 70,249.80 
1986 3,110.00  23,159.40 48,057.60 3,872.70 2,811.36  4,147.90 (16,200.14) 78,199.70 
1987 3,359.00  27,811.20 62,282.40 6,766.90 11,984.15  4,623.20 (11,203.85) 100,219.50 
1988 3,520.00  33,340.10 71,571.20 (270.60) 5,116.43  5,134.80 (23,088.87) 108,160.70 
1989 5,877.00  36,547.70 77,006.60 2,527.50 6,749.91  4,983.70 (24,814.10) 121,958.80 
1990 4,968.00  40,285.00 89,345.40 6,056.80 6,474.10  5,351.00 (28,459.90) 140,655.20 
1991 5,892.00  48,785.00 110,186.90 5,016.00 7,280.50  7,339.00 (34,165.50) 169,879.90 
1992 6,517.00  57,267.00 128,870.80 15,638.70 26,664.50  8,962.00 (21,640.50) 208,293.50 
1993 7,663.00  64,577.00 156,565.30 (4,947.20) 22,473.55  11,301.00 (30,802.45) 223,858.10 
1994 8,987.00  70,583.00 124,670.90 54,556.20 31,527.00  13,959.00 (25,097.00) 258,797.10 
1995 8,331.00  82,668.00 161,562.40 53,428.00 40,667.75  16,363.00 (25,637.25) 305,989.40 
1996 10,079.00  56,914.00 192,062.50 51,025.20 19,206.70  19,328.00 (18,379.30) 310,080.70 
1997 10,360.00  77,999.00 233,548.60 25,138.60 40,677.60  17,821.00 (19,500.40) 347,046.20 
1998 9,677.00  113,919.00 188,466.40 57,416.40 29,684.25  18,769.00 (65,465.75) 369,478.80 
1999 9,428.00  142,147.00 210,191.20 36,217.60 40,513.90  18,870.00 (82,763.10) 397,983.80 
2000 11,217.00  141,016.00 329,030.10 16,544.50 91,216.60  19,468.00 (30,331.40) 497,807.60 
2001 14,726.00  139,367.00 182,203.10 196,905.30 80,947.30  19,178.00 (39,241.70) 533,201.40 
2002 17,567.00  136,556.00 44,120.10 386,355.90 48,843.55  26,414.00 (61,298.45) 584,599.00 
2003 8,165.00  137,882.00 (224,879.90) 748,313.40 50,060.15  30,415.00 (57,406.85) 669,480.50 
2004 7,721.00  162,335.00 (150,808.80) 753,621.70 42,798.95  36,432.00 (83,104.05) 772,868.90 
2005 10,115.00  185,068.00 (12,170.90) 726,164.10 58,251.70  43,462.00 (83,354.30) 909,176.20 
2006 12,529.00  198,725.00 131,677.10 658,542.60 53,916.25  48,439.00 (96,369.75) 1,001,473.70 
2007 15,120.00  269,109.00 61,578.10 864,762.00 78,095.01  58,072.00 (132,941.99) 1,210,569.10 
2008 12,595.00  213,293.00 640,930.20 521,637.50 97,219.52  68,966.00 (47,107.48) 1,388,455.70 
2009 13,012.00  293,641.00 538,484.40 662,663.70 93,845.85  77,006.00 (122,789.15) 1,507,801.10 
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 GRAPHS OF SELECTED MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS 
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 GRAPHS OF SELECTED MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS 
 
Domestic and Foreign Asset Components of Multiplier
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 GRAPHS OF SELECTED MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS 
 
Discretionary Open Market Instruments (RU+A / Deposits)
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 GRAPHS OF SELECTED MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS 
 
Optimal OMO's and the T-Bill Rate
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Policy Targets and Shifts at the State Bank of Pakistan
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 GRAPHS OF SELECTED MONETARY POLICY INDICATORS 
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TABLE NO. 6 RESERVE RATIOS INDICATING THE HISTORICAL TARGETS OF 
PAKISTAN’S MONETARY POLICY 
 
Year M2 / RU Criteria Year 
(-) RF / 
Deposits Governor of SBP 
1979 6.00  1979 0.0960 8.A G N Kazi 
1980 10.08  1980 0.0934 8.A G N Kazi 
1981 6.55  1981 0.1494 8.A G N Kazi 
1982 4.95  1982 0.1522 8.A G N Kazi 
1983 5.68  1983 0.1240 8.A G N Kazi 
1984 5.63  1984 0.1067 8.A G N Kazi 
1985 3.78  1985 0.0931 8.A G N Kazi 
1986 4.39  1986 0.1102 8.A G N Kazi 
1987 3.85  1987 0.0682 9.V.A. Jaffrey 
1988 3.77  1988 0.1279 10.I.A. Hanfi 
1989 3.78  1989 0.1307 11.Kassim Parekh 
1990 3.82  1990 0.1271 11.Kassim Parekh 
1991 3.64  1991 0.1361 10.I.A. Hanfi 
1992 3.93  1992 0.0704 10.I.A. Hanfi 
1993 3.80  1993 0.0849 10.I.A. Hanfi 
1994 5.64  1994 0.0596 12.Mohammad Yaqub 
1995 5.10  1995 0.0514 12.Mohammad Yaqub 
1996 4.89  1996 0.0333 12.Mohammad Yaqub 
1997 4.51  1997 0.0337 12.Mohammad Yaqub 
1998 6.40  1998 0.1010 12.Mohammad Yaqub 
1999 6.09  1999 0.0956 12.Mohammad Yaqub 
2000 4.26  
When a Central 
Bank Targets 
Unborrowed 
Reserves, the ratio 
of money supply to 
unborrowed 
reserves remains 
constant  
2000 0.0328 13.Ishrat Husain 
2001 8.38  2001 0.0398 13.Ishrat Husain 
2002 39.92  2002 0.0530 13.Ishrat Husain 
2003 (9.24) 2003 0.0395 13.Ishrat Husain 
2004 (16.49) 2004 0.0472 13.Ishrat Husain 
2005 (243.74) 2005 0.0394 13.Ishrat Husain 
2006 25.87  2006 0.0391 14.Shamshad Akhtar 
2007 61.83  
The switch to free 
reserve targeting 
disturbed the 
unborrowed 
reserve ratio 
erratically 
2007 0.0483 14.Shamshad Akhtar 
2008 6.86  2008 0.0150 14.Shamshad Akhtar 
2009 8.97  
Settling down of Policy 
Environment 2009 0.0363 14.Shamshad Akhtar 
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